Да упражним демократичното си право да не бъдем чути.

Tag Archives: Bulgaria

WikiLeaks разкрива разузнаване на US службите в България

Guardian пусна документи на американското правителство, които предизвикаха глобален дипломатически скандал. От документ 062392 става ясно, че на 16 юни 2009 г. е излязло разпореждане на американските служби да се следи за определена информация в България, както писа по-рано колегата Максим Проданов.

Документите са свободни за четене, достъпни в сайтовете на Guardian,NY Times,Al Jazeera,Spiegel,El Pais и Le Monde. Тук пускаме документа, който се отнася за България, публикуван от вестник Guardian. Сигурен съм,че US посланикът Джеймс Уорлик има добро обяснение за секретните документи, касаещи България.


Tuesday, 16 June 2009, 21:39
S E C R E T STATE 062392
EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2034
REF: STATE 18756

1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Bulgaria (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Bulgaria (paragraph 2).

A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Bulgaria. The NHCD sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Bulgaria. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).

B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading the the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Bulgarians:

A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community’s collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.

B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Bulgaria: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet „handles“, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

3. (S/NF) Bulgarian NHCD outline – priority issues:

A. National Leadership and Governance 1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4) 2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H) B. Energy Security and Foreign Relations 1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H) 2) Russia (FPOL-4H) 3) European Union (FPOL-4H) 4) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 5) The United States (FPOL-4H) 6) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) C. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5) 2) Money Laundering (MONY-4) 3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) D. National Security 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-3) 5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)

4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:

A. National Leadership and Governance

1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4). Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government, non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, financial stability, intelligence and security services, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about cyber crime. Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems.

2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary.Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability, personality, financial, health, and biometric information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.

3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Popular attitudes about Bulgaria,s evolving political, philosophical, and regional identity. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.

B. Energy Security and Foreign Relations

1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Iran, other Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Bulgarian dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.

2) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade. Details about personal relations between Bulgarian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership, intelligence officials, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies. Leadership and public views about relations with Russia. Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic objectives in the region, and Bulgaria,s vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence. Views about Russian attempts to exploit historic and current ties in order to influence internal developments and advance Russia’s interests in Bulgaria and throughout the region.

3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Evidence of Bulgarian mismanagement of EU funding, and government efforts to ensure transparent management of financial aid. Details about formal and informal alliances between Bulgaria and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Response to Russian efforts to influence EU policies through Bulgaria. Plans and efforts, including investment strategies, regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.

4) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with Black Sea and other regional neighbors. Plans and efforts to jointly respond to challenges regarding counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and illegal migration. Plans and efforts regarding cooperative agreements, especially Black Sea FOR, Harmony, Enhanced Black Sea Security Proposal, and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. Bulgarian participation in US-sponsored programs designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy civil-military relations, and effective management of military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Macedonia and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.

5) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.

6) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China and nations that are hostile to US interests.

C. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges

1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to develop national infrastructure, and private sector and market institutions, including financial system. Plans and efforts to adopt international investment norms, protect intellectual property, and support entrepreneurs, especially in small and medium businesses. Plans and efforts to attract foreign investment. Plans and efforts to protect foreign investors from government corruption and inefficiencies. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Role and attitudes of Currency Board regarding fiscal and monetary policy. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.

2) Money Laundering (MONY-4). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.

3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities, especially Roma and Turks. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.

D. National Security

1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.

2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Bulgarian soil, NATO commands in Bulgaria, and out-of-country deployments of Bulgarian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.

3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Offensive and defensive cyber warfare policies, plans, efforts, and capabilities. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.

4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-3). Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Organizational readiness and capability of border police and customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts to implement legislation and enforce effective export licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Bulgaria as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engaged in sales of weapons or technologies, especially to states that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities. Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties and arrangements.

5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, money laundering, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.

6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.

E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Details about command and control systems and facilities. National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and training. Information about current, and planned upgrades to, public sector communications systems and technologies, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals, trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, and cable and fiber networks. Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating systems, to include second generation and third generation systems. Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication purposes, including planned system upgrades. Details about Internet and Intranet use and infrastructure, including government oversight. Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications service providers and vendors. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology. Details about information repositories associated with radio frequency identification enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.


Как bTV,БНТ и SANA отразиха сирийската визита

От два дни SANA (Сирийската новинарска агенция) отразява подготовката за визитата на Асад в България. Ще кажете, че е защото Сирия е тоталитарна държава. Ще ви разочаровам, но не е това причината. Тя се крие в нещо съвсем различно и по-точно в това, че Сирия гледа на България като стратегически партньор. Досега не е представяна една държава по сирийската национална теливизия (също и частните) по начина, по който България бе показана. В рамките на почти половин час в новинарската емисия от 20:30 ч. на 9.11.2010 се редуваха любопитни факти за страната ни, за нейната история, картини от България и какви са миналите отношения между Дамаск и София. Повтаряха се изрази, като „България е фактор в Източна Европа“, „Въпреки, че е нов член на ЕС, България отбелязва голям напредък“, „България е важен партньор за Сирия“. Към това бяха прибавени и кратки биографии на Бойко Борисов, Николай Младенов и Георги Първанов.

За важността на България за Сирия говори и отделният раздел, създаден в сайта на SANA, посветен на отношенията на Сирия с България и Румъния (такъв има в сайта на националната телевизия). Първата дама на Сирия посети дом за увредени деца, което SANA показа в детайли.

During the official visit paid by President Bashar al-Assad and Mrs. Asma al-Assad to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian President’s Wife Mrs. Zorka Parvanova on Tuesday accompanied Mrs. al-Assad in a tour to the landmarks of the historical city of Sofia and the Center of Saint Mina for Disabled Children, supervised by Mrs. Parvanova.

Mrs. al-Assad and Mrs. Parvanova exchanged talks on the issue of disability and the latest findings reached by the researches and experiments which proved that the integrated care enables the disabled to interact with the family and the surrounding environment, and to be productive and active members in their society.

During a special luncheon to which Mrs. al-Assad was invited by Mrs. Parvanova, the two sides discussed a number of topics on the common cultural and developmental concerns.

Асма ал-Асад е известна с благотворителните си кампании и беше редно да се покаже, че е посетила такъв дом в София. Още повече, че сме в разгара на всякакви телевизионни кампании за деца с увреждания. Ако намерите информация на български, подобна на тази по-горе, моля сложете линк в коментарите. Отделен коментар на агенцията имаше и за срещата между Башар ал-Асад, Цецка Цачева и Бойко Борисов.

Сред българските медии положението беше съвсем различно. Предварителна информация нямаше, а изобщо публикации се появиха в следобедно време и то с няколко изречения. Коментарите под всяка статия пък са повече от обидни. Разбира се, че България е член на ЕС, т.е. сме европейци, но нека не се показваме като пълните високомерни люде. Стана ясно, че тук ни е през левия крачол за Дамаск, арабите и техните инвестиции, но смятам, че можехме малко да се засилим, поне информация за Сирия да се пусне. Във водещите български канали bTV и БНТ имаше коренно различно отношение към новината за визитата на цял кабинет.

Нека да кажем нещо на bTV. Никой не кара телевизията да обича Сирия, сирийците, обичащите Сирия и други такива. Никой не очаква да изпитвате уважение към визитата. Абсолютно никой не кара международния екип на телевизията да прави каквото и да е, особено малко по-дълъг материал за визита от президент и няколко министри. А пък още повече никой не кара един иначе добър журналист като Светослав Иванов да се чувства виновен, че е винил Израел за това, че беше в техен арест и сега връща услугата с подобен материал за Сирия и посещението на Асад в България.

Затова, тъй като никой не кара абсолютно нищо bTV, аз се чудя защо поне не се опитаха да потиснат пристрастията си към американската мечта. Най-малкото защото има официална визита, независимо кой е този човек. Ясно, че това е свобода на словото (дали!?) и всеки може да си говори каквото иска, но да настройваш зрителите към дадена страна, докато има официално посещение на най-високо ниво, то е малко…гнусно. Целият черен PR беше един хубав цирк, показващ, че дори лицемерието е трудно достижимо. Цялата ирония, която се излива от частната и свободна телевизия е направо ужасна. Че целта е да се очерни Първанов, добре, но защо Сирия да бъде намесвана в това? Ясно е, че американската мечта и бленуваният израелски кибуц са далеч от тоталитарна Сирия, но една гледана телевизия, като bTV може и повече от един набързо направен материал, пуснат между другото. Той напълно разби хубавото усещане от материалите на „Глобусът“, представящи Сирия в три поредни съботи.

Нека го кажем иначе – „Глобусът“, колегите ви от международни новини се изплюха и повърнаха върху вашата работа. Другото го оставям на екипите.

Да видим разликата в материалите на БНТ и bTV. Бих казал, че е фрапиращо огромна. Ето текста на БНТ:

Сирия търси път към Евросъюза и заложи на съживяването на връзките с позабравени, но добри партньори като България. Именно на Европа сирийският президент разчита, за да продължи политиката си на разчупване на изолацията на страната си, доскоро наложена от Запада. Съединените щати все още критикуват и санкционират Сирия, че поддържа радикалните групировки Хамас и Хизбула.

В София Башар ал Асад директно заяви, че разчита на България, за да може Евросъюзът да подтикне Израел към по-активни преговори за постигане на мир в Близкия Изток. Българската страна обеща да работи за реактивиране на преговорите за асоцииране между Сирия и Европейския съюз.

Георги Първанов, президент на Република България:

– Бълария обеща, че ще е един от активните фактори по формиране на позицията по отношение на Сирия.

В геополитическото сътрудничество София и Дамаск днес откриха и прагматичната страна. Един от приоритетите, които постави страната ни, е енергетиката. Освен възможност в бъдеще да изнася ток, България разчита на Сирия и за разнообразяване на алтернативните източници и трасета за газ и нефт. Сирия активно работи за строежа на арабския газопровод и нефтопровод между Ирак и Средиземно море.

Башар ал Асад – президент на Арабска република Сирия:

– Доколкото в момента Сирия изгражда стратегически взаимоотношения с Турция за строежа на инфраструктурни проекти, защо да не продължим тази инфраструктура така, че тя да обхване и България. Това би могло да се отнася за енергийните и транспортни системи на страните.

В София Башар ал Асад сподели, че гледа с разума, а не с очите си, защото очите понякога лъжат. Той наследи президентския пост от баща си през 2000година и спечели втори мандат без усилие, защото се оказа единствен кандидат. Явно разчитайки на разума си, той се опитва да увеличи тежестта на Сирия в региона – в добри отношения е с Иран, загърби историческите различия с Турция и търси път към Запада. Твърди се, че за това известно влияние е оказала съпругата му. Асма е израснала и учила в Лондон. Така и не се отказа от британското си гражданство. Финансист с диплома по френска литература 35-годишната първа дама сега работи за развитието на образованието в селските райони.

Автор: Даниел Чипев


Сега прочетете текста на bTV:

България може да изнася ток за Сирия, след като приключи строителството на АЕЦ „Белене“. Около тази идея се обединиха президентите на България и Сирия. За първата официална визита на сирийски държавен глава у нас, след повече от 25 години, разказва Светослав Иванов.

Фамилията Асад управлява Сирия вече 40 години. По време на последното си посещение у нас преди четвърт век бащата е обсъждал сближаването със Съветския съюз, а днес синът обсъди сближаването с Европейския.

Силният вятър не отложи церемонията по официалното му посрещане. Президентът Асад, който поздрави почетния караул на български със „Здравейте, гвардейци!“ поднесе цветя пред паметника на Незнайния войн, няколко минути след като вятърът издуха червената пътека пред него.

Това може да се възприеме и като вятър на промяната за двустранните отношения, защото на пресконференцията Първанов и Асад демонстрираха близки отношения.

„България, със строителството на втората атомна централа в „Белене” би могла да създаде предпоставки за износ на електроенергия към Сирия, където има недостиг“, съобюи президентът Първанов.

Асад, който е специализирал офталмология, призова България да „подтикне“ Израел по пътя на близкоизточния мирен процес. Как обаче един офталмолог вижда мястото си в политиката през своите собствени очи?

„Бих искал да ви кажа, че аз гледам с разума си, не толкова с очите. Защото очите регистрират, много, но е важно след като сме видели с очите, да видим и с ума, защото в противен случай – нищо не сме видели”, обяснява Башар Асад.

След като се видя с президента, Асад се срещна „на четири очи“ и с премиера. С него освен за енергетика са били обсъждани проекти в сферите на транспорта и туризма. Десетки сирийци у нас пък имаха възможност да видят държавния глава на живо, след края на официалното посрещане.

За списание „Икономист“ Сирия е една от най-авторитарните държави в арабския свят – след Либия и Саудитска Арабия. За сирийците в България обаче това не е вярно.



Vodpod videos no longer available.

Видеото на bTV не може да се добави тук, затова го вижте в сайта им. Вярвам, че ще забележите колко е различно. набляга се върху тока от непостроената АЕЦ. Хубаво, Първанов обещал някакви неща. Добре, ама имаше други работи, случили се на разговорите между Първанов и Асад. Например подписване на разни договори и т.н.

Вестник „Капитал“ ме цитира за критиката ми към bTV:


%d блогъра харесват това: